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Is it true that the “objects” of the Tractatus are phenomena, direct experience, or sense-data? I 
think it is, like some interpreters, however, we have some problems to solve. The most serious one is 
the so-called “Color Exclusion Problem”. This problem is that as long as objects are sense-data, the 
independency of elementary propositions seems to conflicts the incompatibility of colors. 
Some interpreters such as Mr. and Mrs. Hintikka, two of the most famous interpreters of 
Wittgenstein, have tried to solve this problem by avoiding this conflict. Their solution is deliberate, 
but I argue that it fails. 
Unlike them, I believe that the Color Exclusion Problem was not a problem for Wittgenstein to 
solve, when he wrote the Tractatus, because he was confused about his own idea of the 
“contradiction”. So, the Color Exclusion Problem does not threaten our interpretation of the objects 
as sense-data, though it does threaten the Tractatus. This is what made Wittgenstein change his mind 
after he wrote the book. 
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